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Ugly Bodies, Pretty Bodies
Scott Westerfeld’s Uglies and the Inhumanity of Culture
Abstract: Scott Westerfeld’s Uglies imagines a society where the body is under total control and the universal beauty of the body after dramatic reconstructive surgery at sixteen guarantees that everyone will be “equal.” To the young adult readership, such a world holds understandable appeal: the idea of avoiding the pains of coming to age in one’s own body is a tempting one. The utopian construct of a society where all difference, and thus all conflict, is erased is a popular social fantasy. But Westerfeld offers his audience more than a vision of a status-less utopia: he offers insight into what might come of humanity losing its connection to its own bodies. His world of Pretties is truly one where beauty is only skin-deep, and all the beautiful creations of culture have been abandoned for a new world of instant gratification and meaningless social relationships.
---
We take for granted the cultural signifiers of other people’s bodies. We judge a person’s heritage from what we see, whether those symbols are inherent, such as skin tone or eye color, or chosen, such as clothing and hair style. Yet each year we have further and unprecedented control over the body we present to the world. Scott Westerfeld imagines a society that takes control over the body many steps further. The society of Westerfeld’s Uglies seems to be utopia. Everyone is equal. Children are raised by a collective boarding school until they are sixteen. At sixteen, they are transformed into “Pretties”: their bodies reshaped into perfection. The city of New Pretties is home to partying newcomers to a glamorous world, and there is always enough to go around. Even age is not to be feared: it simply means transitioning into the life of a Middle Pretty and finally an Old Pretty to live out life provided for and happy. Life among the Pretties is perfect, and the misery of being younger than sixteen and hideous is endurable for the sake of the beauty that is instantly obtained on a sixteenth birthday. This society is a utopia easily understood by the young adult audience, when the pains of coming to age in one’s own body are strongly felt and the perfection that seems to radiate from magazines and movie screens seems far preferable. Yet Westerfeld offers his audience more than a vision of a status-less utopia: he offers insight into what might come of humanity losing its connection to its own bodies. His world of Pretties is truly one where beauty is only skin-deep, and all the beautiful creations of culture have been abandoned for a new world of instant gratification and meaningless social relationships.
Westerfeld’s narrator, Tally, is a teenager on the verge of realizing her dream of transformation from Ugly to Pretty. She sees herself as Ugly because she has no image to compare herself to except that of her friends who have gone past their sixteenth birthday and moved into the city life of constant partying and romance. Yet Tally sees her friend change in more than appearance when he goes from Ugly to Pretty. Her friend Shay tells her that you don’t have to be Pretty, and she leads Tally to a culture in the woods where no one is Pretty, and no one is Ugly: people are just what they are, and they live on work, not on matter replicators and parties. These people who live in a way more familiar to us are the second culture central to Westerfeld’s work: the denizens of Smoke, the wild city. A third culture exists only in memory: the Rusties, the culture that existed before the Pretties. The Rusties as a civilization collapsed long ago. These three cultures have no parallels to any specific groups alive today. We cannot as readers easily equate these groups to any within our own experience. But simply because they belong to the world of the fantastical, that does not make them less powerful. Their very lack of the traditional trappings we associate with cultural depictions is a narrative in itself.
Despite the existence of these three very distinct cultures, Westerfeld’s society is difficult to classify as a multicultural society because these cultures lack much of what traditionally accompanies cultural boundaries. Definitions of culture incorporate a full range of diversity, as Mingshui Cai reflects upon: “if issues of inequality, discrimination, oppression, and exploitation are excluded from consideration when we define multicultural literature, there is a danger of diluting, or even deconstructing, the sociopolitical goals that underlie the term. When culture is used as a broad concept in the definition of multicultural literature, it incorporates nationality, ethnicity, class, gender, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, family status, geographic difference, linguistic variation, and the list goes on” (Cai 271). In a realistic society, we expect this diversity to be reflected. Yet Westerfeld’s fantastic society has evolved beyond most such distinctions, and in that evolution is a commentary on the nature of culture itself. The differences between the three cultures create much of the tension of the novel. That tension is magnified because the dominant society--that of the Pretties--doesn’t acknowledge meaningful distinction among its own members: you are either Pretty or you are not. 
Advocates for responsible children’s literature concern themselves with the depiction of “other” cultures in a realistic and fair representation. According to Peter Hunt, while the classics of the past might assert a world where “only white people exist, only the middle class matter, and that boys will be boys and girls will be good,” the modern reader—and his and her parents and teachers—ask for a world that is as multifaceted as our own. (Hunt 166). Hunt draws our attention to how this preoccupation is very different from our feelings about adult fiction: “We want to select what the children may or may not know, and at which stage in their development they may know it. As adults, we might be able to make allowances for, say, Hugh Lofting’s racism, but can the child?” (Hunt 169). We expect the texts of children’s literature to reflect the multiculturalism of our world: as we are not part of a homogenous culture ourselves, our “subjectivity” is influenced by and expects a multicultural text, as Nealon and Giroux note in their discussion of cultural theory (Nealon and Giroux 55). In realistic fiction, this requires a multicultural world with full fleshed narrators and characters from a rainbow of cultural backgrounds. 
This expectation is more difficult to fulfill and analyze when it is carried into a fantastic world, such as that of Scott Westerfeld’s Uglies. Looking at magazine from the Rusty civilization that long since destroyed itself, Westerfeld’s narrator Tally is horrified: “She’d never seen so many wildly different faces before. Mouths and eyes and noses of every imaginable shape, all combined insanely on people of every age. And the bodies. Some were grotesquely fat, or weirdly over-muscled, or uncomfortably thin, and almost all of them had wrong, ugly proportions. But instead of being ashamed of their deformities, the people were laughing and kissing and posing, as if all the pictures had been taken at some huge party” (198). Uglies is a story of a society that is post-culture and post-human. Physical barriers of difference have been rendered obsolete by the elimination of difference. We know as residents of a Rusties compatible civilization that we do not all laugh and smile at what might be called our deformities. The allure of a world where everyone is “pretty” is understandable, particularly for those of us who are most aware of being thought of as fat, or ugly, or undesirable. We know that even if someone is laughing in a picture shame and self-consciousness still often lurk beneath the smile. We also know that when we meet someone for the first time we are encouraged by society to judge their relationship to our self, and to decide where their attributes place their status. Are they a potential distraction for our significant other? Are they so ugly as to be pitied? Or are they so pretty as to be idolized?
These considerations that we make every day, wittingly or no, do not enter into meetings within the Pretty society. Even the idea of race is antique, a lesson to be taught in history classes as an old notion belonging to the Rusties. Tally is relieved to know that such strife is no longer a part of culture: “’People killed one another over stuff like having different skin color’…no matter how many times they repeated it at school, she’d never really quite believed that one. ‘So what if people look more alike now? It’s the only way to make people equal’” (45). Tally’s sentiment is not purely a revelation for the fantastic world. It is the crux of a common argument that Westerfeld’s text responds to: would the world be “better off” with a single culture? If the source of so much of the world’s conflict seems to be driven by difference—difference of power, difference of religion, difference of values, and difference of resources—isn’t it natural to conclude that the Rusty society was flawed in a way that the Pretty utopia corrects?
The world of the Rusties belongs to a murky territory between the real and the fantastic. While it is a prelude to the society Westerfeld creates, it is more known to the reader as “our” world. Westerfeld does not need to tell us much about the Rusties: the violent, ugly, racist, discriminatory, destructive burners of forests are quite familiar. The ruins of their cities and cars and roller coasters may be “other” to Tally—not so to us. We do not need to long contemplate the absurdity Tally sees in the Rusty lifestyle: ““On school trips, the teachers always made the Rusties out to be so stupid. You almost couldn’t believe people lived like this, burning trees to clear land, burning oil for heat and power, setting the atmosphere on fire with their weapons” (62). The culture that Tally can’t understand is a culture very familiar to the reader: “Everyone judged everyone else based on their appearance. People who were taller got better jobs, and people even voted for some politicians just because they weren’t quite as ugly as everybody else” (44). These are realities many of us would love to see come to an end.
Westerfeld first depicts this new homogenous society as utopia. The illusion is quickly dismantled, but the destruction of personal identity must be balanced against the disadvantages of the Rusty model. In Pretty town, no one is hired or elected on the basis of looks. No one hates or kills based on skin, or hair, or smile. The Pretty culture itself is one of great equality. All children receive the same quality of education and there is no place for socioeconomic divide. If everyone is equally beautiful and well-provided for, what is there to envy? Yet just as there is no race, there is no religion. There is no need for cultural models to explain why this person possesses a lot while others have little: there are no such inequalities to explain. But just as there is no difference, there is no art. Even handwriting is a forgotten tradition. Clothing is a commodity changeable at will through matter replicators that recycle material in a continual cycle. Nothing lasts, and no one is upset. Even family is minimized: children are all taken at a certain age and raised in boarding school until they are ready to enter Pretty society. There seems to be a privileging of the white body in Pretties society, but that may be more in the packaging than in the text. Race is never referred to, and no character is described in terms of racial features. The society is “post-race:” all physical distinctions are rendered meaningless. Like the Star Bellied Sneetches of Dr. Suess’s book, once anyone can gain or remove a star, it loses all significance.
But the very technology of beauty in Westerfeld’s world has done more than make being pretty easy: it has made having this perfection a necessity to the society’s residents. When Tally sees a true old person, surgery free, she cannot suppress her horror: “The Boss was an old ugly…here was the wrinkled, veined, discolored, shuffling, horrific truth, right before her eyes. His milky eyes glared at them as he berated whoever was on the phone, in a rattling voice and waving one claw at them to go away” (197). Why would anyone want a future looking like that? The choice seems simple: “I want to be happy, and looking like a real person is the first step” (84). Looking like a “real person”: apparently, in a world of perfection that takes more than just being born. Stuart Sim suggests that this level of transformation “is into what we might call ‘inhumanism;’ a deliberate blurring of the lines between human beings and machines, going well past the point of current medical procedures” (Sim 15). Pretty society would argue differently: the claim all children are taught is that this beauty is what evolution demands: “There was a certain kind of beauty, a prettiness everyone could see. Big eyes and full lips like a kid’s; smooth, clear skin; symmetrical features; and a thousand other little clues. Somewhere in the backs of their minds, people were always looking for these markers…a million years of evolution had made it part of the human brain” (Westerfeld 16) . The Pretties do not have to make do with anything less than the fullest realization of this ideal. Any partner offers the potential for complete biological fulfillment when every partner available meets this supposed ideal.
The price of this utopia? Humanity. Human nature is in the flaws, in the differences. Asymmetry is the first thing to go in the transformation to Prettiness: “Ugly faces were always asymmetrical; neither half looked exactly like the other. So the first thing the morpho software did was take each side of your face and double it, like holding a mirror right down the middle, creating two examples of perfect symmetry” (Westerfeld 42) While the software transformation takes only the click of a button, the surgical change is more painful: as Tally comes to realize: “Maybe when they do the operation—when they grind and stretch your bones to the right shape, peel off your face and rub all your skin away, and stick in plastic cheekbones so you look like everybody else—maybe after going through all that you just aren’t very interesting anymore” (50). Not an appealing process, but with it comes not just a lifetime of beauty but of perfection. Bones are replaced with indestructible material, teeth made strong. Little is left of the original body. For those of us anchored to our physical selves in all their deformed reality, it is hard to imagine willingly stepping in for such a full overhaul. We would be hard-pressed to imagine who it is that would step out on the other side.
With each step towards Sim’s notion of the inhuman, we see fundamental changes in culture. Each invention brings us closer to the cyborg body: we have seen how television and later the Internet changed both our connectivity and our selves. When distinctions of the body are destroyed, do distinctions of culture follow? In her discussion of posthumanity, N. Katherine Hayles argues that body and culture are linked: “The body produces culture at the same time that culture produces the body” (Hayles 200). Certainly we can see how the change of the body impacts personal identity. The characters that identify their “natural” bodies as ugly only do so because of the “pretty” comparison, as Shay tries to explain to Tally. Old age becomes repellent when it’s something never seen before. We might comfort ourselves with the thought that if we were, today, to be thrust knowingly into another body, it would not much change who we are. Yet every day another man or woman seeks another type of comfort in the arms of a plastic surgeon who offers transformations more minor in scale but with the promise of change for the better. We constantly clothe ourselves in different labels and trends and change everything from our nail color to the layering of our hair to better reflect, or create, our self. Other members of our culture and subculture are first identifiable to us from the outside. We know if someone is “like us” or other from the first glance. While we believe we clothe ourselves in the trappings of personal identity, those trappings are very much linked to a stronger cultural identity. Our body is the essence of our social connection. Without its distinguishing factors, we’d be hard pressed to find our community—even a child’s resemblance to her mother would disappear.
It is therefore only natural that when the Ugly body is left behind in the transformation to being Pretty, more is left behind than physical characteristics. The change goes deeper than the reformed skin. The process of becoming pretty in Westerfeld’s world sets up a “false self”, which as Arlie Hochschild argues can become its own dominant personality: “In the extreme case, the false self may set itself up as the real self, which remains completely hidden. More commonly, the false self allows the true self a life of its own, which emerges when there is little danger of its being used by others. The actual content of feelings –or wishes, or fantasies, or actions –is not what distinguishes the false self from the true self; the difference lies in whether we claim them as ‘our own.’ This claiming applies to our outward behavior, our surface acting…” (Hochschild 194-195). Tally notices that when her friends become pretty, they no longer act like “themselves.” Westerfeld creates a biological explanation for the transformation: when you become pretty, lesions are added to your brain to make you more docile. Yet the concept works even without the lesions. The physical transformation of becoming pretty is a fundamental reshaping. The expectation of being the same person afterwards is the unreasonable belief. As Tally says of becoming pretty: “It changes the way you think” (268). Brain lesions or no, becoming Pretty is a fundamental transformation that allows the characters to take their place within a truly homogenous society.
In order to create a world where everyone is happy, the creators of Pretty society decided to transform those who would become artists and instigators into less than what they were. The choice is made for them so that those who would be persecuted in Rusty culture can become equals. This chilling scenario is not unlike the battles for dominance that Beverly Clark observes as a problem with multiculturalism in children’s literature: “advocacy of the rights of one group often seem to entail metaphorically castigating another” (Clark 10). The desire for equality often ignore that which is not equal. Not everyone is born with the same desires and abilities. Equal opportunity is an illusion unless diversity itself is destroyed. Westerfeld’s world takes homogenization to its final extreme: “Perhaps the logical conclusion of everyone looking the same was everyone thinking the same” (273). If we come to Westerfeld’s world placing strong value in our own cultural identity, we will be first struck by all that the Pretties lack. We continually focus on the desire to be ourselves, whatever those may be. The addition of more technology to our lives over the last fifty years has had the opposite effect it has on Westerfeld’s society. The more technology homogenizes our cultural surroundings, the more we desire to reject that homogenization, even if only on the surface. As counter-culture artist Theodore Roszak notes: “…consider the desperate need people in the advanced urban industrial societies seem to feel for more personal recognition and personal autonomy…” (Roszak 166). The ability of the Pretties to continually recycle and change their bodies and clothing at the slightest whim seems to be the fullest fulfillment of that personal autonomy. Yet when all these bodies come from the same mold that which seems to be personal lacks true distinction. The signifiers of culture are lost in a sea of meaningless bodies.
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